On blocking coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind

Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber and Akira Yamazaki
Additional contact information
Joseph Greenberg: McGill University
Shlomo Weber: Southern Methodist University
Akira Yamazaki: Meisei University

No 2, Discussion Papers from Meisei University, School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Warlasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers α and β betwenn 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between α and β, is arbitrarily close to 1/2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large.

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2006-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mei:wpaper:2

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