Assessing strategic risk

Robert Aumann and Jacques Dreze

No 2005020, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversary's choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction, and provide an axiomatic foundation for it.

Date: 2005-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2005.html (text/html)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to sites.uclouvain.be:443 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
Journal Article: Assessing Strategic Risk (2009)
Working Paper: Assessing strategic risk (2009)
Working Paper: Assessing Strategic Risk (2005)
Working Paper: Assessing Strategic Risk (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2005020

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().