Assessing Strategic Risk
Robert Aumann and
No 2005020, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques
In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversary’s choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction, and provide an axiomatic fondation for it.
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Journal Article: Assessing Strategic Risk (2009)
Working Paper: Assessing strategic risk (2009)
Working Paper: Assessing strategic risk (2005)
Working Paper: Assessing Strategic Risk (2004)
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