Market games and successive oligopolies

Jean Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel (), Tanguy van Ypersele and Skerdilajda Zanaj

No 2007010, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting from the two approaches are analysed under different technological regimes, decreasing vs constant returns.

Keywords: successive oligopolies; market games; entry; double marginalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L1 L13 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Market Games in Successive Oligopolies (2013)
Working Paper: Market games in successive oligopolies (2013)
Working Paper: Market Games in Successive Oligopolies (2013)
Working Paper: Market games and successive oligopolies (2008)
Working Paper: Market Games and Successive Oligopolies (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2007010

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