Market Games in Successive Oligopolies

Jean Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel (), Tanguy van Ypersele and Skerdilajda Zanaj

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Abstract: In this paper we first introduce an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting from the two approaches are analysed under di¤erent technological regimes, decreasing vs constant returns.

Keywords: Economie; quantitative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2013, 15 (3), pp.397-410. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12023⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Market Games in Successive Oligopolies (2013)
Working Paper: Market games in successive oligopolies (2013)
Working Paper: Market games and successive oligopolies (2008)
Working Paper: Market games and successive oligopolies (2007)
Working Paper: Market Games and Successive Oligopolies (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01499637

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12023

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