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Data games. Sharing public goods with exclusion

Pierre Dehez () and Daniela Tellone ()

No 2008010, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: A group of agents considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements owned by some of them. These elements are pure public goods with exclusion i.e. nonrival but excludable goods like for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper addresses the question of how should agents be compensated for the goods they own. It is shown that this problem can be framed as a cost sharing game – called "data game" – to which standard cost sharing rules like the Shapley value or the nucleolus can then be applied and compared.

Keywords: cost sharing; compensation; Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D46 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-gth, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Data games: sharing public goods with exclusion (2013)
Working Paper: Data games: Sharing public goods with exclusion (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Data Games: Sharing public goods with exclusion (2009)
Working Paper: Data games. Sharing public goods with exclusion (2008) Downloads
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