Data Games: Sharing public goods with exclusion

Pierre Dehez () and Daniela Tellone ()

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: A group of firms consider collaborating on a project which requires a combination of elements which are owned by some of them. These elements are nonrival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion like for instance knowledge, data or informations, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms should be compensated for the goods they own. We shown that this problem can be framed as a cost sharing game to which standard allocation rules like the Shapley value, the nucleolus or accountings formulas can be applied and compared. Our analysis is inspired by the need for a cooperation between European chemical firms within the regulation program REACH which requires them to submit by 2018 a detailed analysis of the substances they produce or import.

Keywords: cost sharing; Shapley value; core; nucleolus. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D46 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion (2013)
Working Paper: Data games: sharing public goods with exclusion (2013)
Working Paper: Data games: Sharing public goods with exclusion (2011)
Working Paper: Data games. Sharing public goods with exclusion (2008)
Working Paper: Data games. Sharing public goods with exclusion (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-31

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