Prodigality and myopia. Two rationales for social security

Pierre Pestieau and Uri Possen
Additional contact information
Uri Possen: Cornell University

No 2008011, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Among the rationales for social security, there is the fact that some people have to be forced to save. To explain undersaving, rational prodigality and hyperbolic preferences are often cited but treated separably. In this paper we study those two particular behaviors that lead to forced saving within an optimal income tax second-best setting.

Keywords: social security; myopia; dual-self model; prodigality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: PRODIGALITY AND MYOPIA—TWO RATIONALES FOR SOCIAL SECURITY* (2008)
Working Paper: Prodigality and myopia. Two rationales for social security (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2008011

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