Unions' relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining

Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Cecilia Vergari ()

No 2010076, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider a model of wage determination with private information in a duopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions' relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity.

Keywords: relative position; wage bargaining; private information; strike activity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D60 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-lab
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https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2010.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: UNIONS' RELATIVE CONCERNS AND STRIKES IN WAGE BARGAINING (2014)
Working Paper: Unions’ relative concerns and strikes in wage bargaining (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010076

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