Competition for leadership in teams

Ana Mauleon, Simon Schopohl () and Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Simon Schopohl: CORE, Université catholique de Louvain

No 2017033, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We analyze a model of information centralization in teams where players can only exchange information through an endogenous network. Over several periods each player can either pass or not pass her information to her neighbors. Once one player has central

Keywords: communication network; dynamic network game; information transmission; leadership; pairwise; team project (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition for leadership in teams (2020)
Working Paper: Competition for leadership in teams (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2017033

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