Competition for leadership in teams

Ana Mauleon, Simon Schopohl and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 3133, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We analyze a model of information centralization in teams where players can only exchange information through an endogenous network. Over several periods each player can either pass or not pass her information to her neighbors. Once one player has centralized all the information, all players receive some payoff. The winner who collects all the information gets an additional reward. Since each player discounts payoffs over time, she faces the dilemma of either letting another player centralizing all the information fast, or trying to collect all the information by herself and to overtake the leadership. We find that there is always a single winner who centralizes the information at equilibrium and we characterize the winner and the duration for any network and for any discount factor. We show that the star network is always pairwise stable. More surprisingly, we find that even networks in which the centralization takes a long time can be pairwise stable.

Keywords: communication network; dynamic network game; information transmis- sion; leadership; pairwise stability; team project; war of attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02-12
Note: In : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Vol. 177, p. 19-33 (2020)
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Journal Article: Competition for leadership in teams (2020)
Working Paper: Competition for leadership in teams (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3133

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.026

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