Bayesian implementation, efficiency, and independence classes

d’Aspremont, Claude () and Jacques Crémer ()
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d’Aspremont, Claude: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium
Jacques Crémer: Toulouse School of Economics

No 2025002, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The theory of Bayesian mechanism design is of interest to economists andcomputer scientists alike. It has focused on two extreme assumptions on the beliefs of the agents, full-freeness (or independence) and no-freeness (or Beliefs Determine Preferences). We discuss more general conditions that cover intermediate cases between these two extremes and characterize the corresponding set of implementable mechanisms. We also discuss applications of these results to economics and to computer science.

Pages: 47
Date: 2025-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2025002

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