Bayesian implementation, efficiency, and independence classes

Jacques Crémer () and Claude d'Aspremont
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Jacques Crémer: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Claude d'Aspremont: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain

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Abstract: The theory of Bayesian mechanism design is of interest to economists and computer scientists alike. It has focused on two extreme assumptions on the beliefs of the agents, full-freeness (or independence) and no-freeness (or Beliefs Determine Preferences). We discuss more general conditions that cover intermediate cases between these two extremes and characterize the corresponding set of implementable mechanisms. We also discuss applications of these results to economics and to computer science.

Date: 2024-11-22
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