Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete informations

Francoise Forges

No 1071, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 1993-01-01
Note: In : Theory and Decision, 35, 277-310, 1993
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Working Paper: Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (1993)
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