Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers

Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 1729, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2004-01-01
Note: In : Theory and Decision, 56, 291-324, 2004
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Journal Article: Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers (2004)
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