Cooperation, stability, and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion

Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens

No 2092, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2009-01-01
Note: In : R.Guesnerie and H.Tulkens (eds.), The design of climate policy. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 166-186, 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion (2006)
Working Paper: Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion (2006)
Working Paper: Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion (2006)
Working Paper: COOPERATION, STABILITY AND SELF- ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION (2006)
Working Paper: Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion (2006)
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