Classical electoral competition under approval voting

Jean-François Laslier and Francois Maniquet

No 2283, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2010-01-01
Note: In : Chapter 17 in J.-F. Laslier and M.R. Sanver (eds.), Handbook on Approval Voting, Studies in Choice and Welfare, Heidelberg, Springer, 415-429, 2010
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Chapter: Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting (2010)
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