Games for cautious players: the equilibrium in secure strategies

Mikhail Iskakov, Alexey Iskakov and Claude d'Aspremont

No 2966, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2018-01-01
Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 28(1), 110, 58-70, 2018
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Related works:
Journal Article: Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies (2018)
Working Paper: Games for cautious players: the equilibrium in secure strategies (2016)
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