Horizon-K Farsightedness in Criminal Networks

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 3167, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set consisting of the complete network is a horizon-K farsighted set whenever the degree of farsightedness of the criminals is larger than or equal to (n−1). Moreover, the complete network is the unique horizon-(n−1) farsighted set. Hence, the predictions obtained in case of completely farsighted criminals still hold when criminals are much less farsighted.

Keywords: limited farsightedness; stability; criminal networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2021-07-05
Note: In: Games, 2021, 12(3), 56
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Related works:
Journal Article: Horizon- K Farsightedness in Criminal Networks (2021)
Working Paper: Horizon-K Farsightedness in Criminal Networks (2021)
Working Paper: Horizon-K Farsightedness in Criminal Networks (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3167

DOI: 10.3390/g12030056

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