R&D and market sharing agreements

Jérôme Dollinger (), Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch ()
Additional contact information
Jérôme Dollinger: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium
Vincent Vannetelbosch: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium

No 3284, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We analyze the formation of R&D alliances and market sharing (MS) agreements by which firms commit not to enter in each other’s territory in oligopolistic markets. We show that R&D alliance structures are stable only in the presence of MS agreements. Thus, long lasting R&D alliances could signal the existence of some MS agreement in the industry. We characterize the set of stable symmetric pairs of coalition structures with identical R&D and MS structure. In addition, we show the stability of a class of asymmetric pairs of coalition structures where the most efficient firms form both an R&D and a MS agreement while the other firms do not form any MS agreement but form two smaller R&D alliances. Even though MS agreements are detrimental for consumers, we show that the stable pairs of coalition structures are a better outcome for consumers than no cooperation at all.

Keywords: R&D alliances; Market sharing agreements; Oligopoly; Cournot competition; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2024-03-06
Note: In: Economic Theory, 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: R &d and market sharing agreements (2024)
Working Paper: R&D and Market Sharing Agreements (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3284

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01554-z

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().