Minimal farsighted instability

Pierre de Callataÿ, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch ()
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Vincent Vannetelbosch: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium

No 3286, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We propose the notion of minimal farsighted instability to determine the states that are more likely to emerge in the long run when agents are farsighted. A state is mini‐ mally farsighted unstable if there is no other state which is more farsightedly stable. To formulate what it means to be more farsightedly stable, we compare states by comparing (in the set inclusion or cardinal sense) their sets of farsighted defeating states. We next compare states in terms of their absorbtiveness by comparing both their sets of farsighted defeating states (i.e. in terms of their stability) and their sets of farsighted defeated states (i.e. in terms of their reachability). A state is maximally farsighted absorbing if there is no other state which is more farsightedly absorbing. We provide general results for characterizing minimally farsighted unstable states and maximally farsighted absorbing states, and we study their relationships with alternative notions of farsightedness. Finally, we use experimental data to show the relevance of the new solution concepts.

Keywords: Social environments; States; Stability comparisons; Farsighted players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C70 D20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2024-03-10
Note: In: International Journal of Game Theory, 2024, vol. 53(2), p. 493-523
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3286

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00887-2

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