Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria connot be improved upon

Herve Moulin and Jean-Philippe Vial

No 359, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 1978-01-01
Note: In : International Journal of Game Theory, 7(3/4), 201-221, 1978
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