Wages as sorting mechanisms in competitive markets with asymmetric information: a theory of testing

J. Luis Guasch and Andrew Weiss

No 402, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 1980-01-01
Note: In : Review of Economic Studies, 47, 653-664, 1980
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Journal Article: Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing (1980)
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