Bargaining power, fear of disagreement, and wage settlements: theory and evidence from U.S. industry

Jan Svejnar

No 720, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 1986-01-01
Note: In : Econometrica, 54(5), 1055-1078, 1986
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry (1986)
Working Paper: Bargaining power, fear of disagreement and wage settlements: theory and evidence from U.S. industry (1984)
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