Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation

Ezra Einy and Abraham Neyman ()

No 872, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 1989-01-01
Note: In : Journal of Economic Theory, 48(2), 369-385, 1989
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Journal Article: Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation (1989)
Working Paper: Large symmetric games and characterized by completeness of the desirability relation (1988)
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