Growth, Import Dependence and War

Kevin O'Rourke and Roberto Bonfatti

No 10073, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Existing theories of pre-emptive war typically predict that the leading country may choose to launch a war on a follower who is catching up, since the follower cannot credibly commit to not use their increased power in the future. But it was Japan who launched a war against the West in 1941, not the West that pre-emptively attacked Japan. Similarly, many have argued that trade makes war less likely, yet World War I erupted at a time of unprecedented globalization. This paper develops a theoretical model of the relationship between trade and war which can help to explain both these observations. Dependence on strategic imports can lead follower nations to launch pre-emptive wars when they are potentially subject to blockade.

Keywords: Blockade; History; Trade; War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 F52 N70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Growth, Import Dependence, and War (2018)
Working Paper: Growth, Import Dependence and War (2014)
Working Paper: Growth, Import Dependence and War (2014)
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