Linking Competition and Trade Policies in Central and East European Countries

Bernard Hoekman and Petros C Mavroidis

No 1009, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper explores options for governments of Central and East European countries to increase the sensitivity of competition law enforcement to trade and investment policy, thereby supporting a liberal trade policy stance. The competition laws of these countries tend to resemble European Union (EU) competition disciplines (Articles 85-86 of the Treaty of Rome), but leave great scope for discretion on the part of enforcement authorities to interpret the relevant statutes. Much can therefore be done through appropriate wording of criteria and implementation guidelines with the framework of currently existing legislation. Active enforcement of competition laws and maintenance of a liberal trade policy will be crucial not only for national welfare, but also in terms of eliminating the threat of contingent protection on the part of EU firms. It is suggested that a link be sought between competition law enforcement and antidumping investigations in the context of the Association Agreements with the EU.

Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe; Competition Policy; Regional Trade Agreements; Trade Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1009 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1009

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1009
orders@cepr.org

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (repec@cepr.org).