Are Donors Afraid of Charities' Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provision

Kimberley Scharf, Carlo Perroni, Ganna Pogrebna and Sarah Sandford

No 10179, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study contestability in non-profit markets where non-commercial providers supply a homogeneous collective good or service through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit markets, in the non-profit case the absence of price-based sales contracts between providers and donors means that fixed costs are directly relevant to donors, and that they can translate into an entry barrier, protecting the position of an inefficient incumbent; or that, conversely, they can make it possible for inefficient newcomers to contest the position of a more efficient incumbent. Evidence from laboratory experiments show that fixed cost driven trade-offs between payoff dominance and perceived risk can lead to inefficient selection.

Keywords: Not-for-profit organizations; Entry; Core funding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
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