Dynamic Spatial Competition Between Multi-Store Firms
Victor Aguirregabiria () and
Gustavo Vicentini
No 10273, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We propose a dynamic model of an oligopoly industry characterized by spatial competition between multi-store retailers. Firms compete in prices and decide where to open or close stores depending on demand conditions and the number of competitors at different locations, and on location-specific private-information shocks. We develop an algorithm to approximate a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in our model, and propose a procedure for the estimation of the parameters of the model using panel data on number of stores, prices, and quantities at multiple geographic locations within a city. We also present numerical examples to illustrate the model and algorithm.
Keywords: Industry dynamics; Spatial competition; Spatial preemption; Store location; Sunk costs; Cannibalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L13 L81 R10 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-geo, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP10273 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10273
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP10273
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().