First-Mover Advantage in Round-Robin Tournaments

Aner Sela and Reut Megidish
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alex Krumer

No 10274, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study round-robin tournaments with one prize and four symmetric players. There are three rounds, each of which includes two sequential matches where each player plays against a different opponent in every round. Each pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium and show that a player who plays in the first match of each of the first two rounds has a first-mover advantage as reflected by a significantly higher winning probability as well as a significantly higher expected payoff than his opponents. Therefore, if the contest designer wishes to sustain the fair play principle he has to schedule all the matches in each round at the same time in order to obstruct a meaningful advantage to one of the players.

Keywords: All-pay contests; Round-robin tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments (2017)
Working Paper: FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE IN ROUND-ROBIN TOURNAMENTS (2015)
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