Social background, education and inequality

Torben M Andersen

No 10433, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The role of social background for educational choices and outcomes is considered in an overlapping generations setting. It is shown that the impediments for education created by social factors are similar to a market imperfection, and publicly provided education may lead to a Pareto improvement. Policies affecting the share of skilled release a dynamic adjustment process via the change in the social background of youth. An increase (decrease) in the share of skilled thus has a cumulative effect over time increasing (decreasing) the share of skilled further. Active and passive means of redistribution thus differ both in the impact and long-run effects. Passive redistribution benefits non-skilled on impact but increases their share over time, while active redistribution does not benefit the non-skilled on impact (but their children) but leads to more skilled over time. It is an implication that a large "active" public sector may lead to higher income and less inequality than a more "passive" public sector.

Keywords: Active and passive redistribution; Education; Intergenerational mobility; Social barriers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D3 H2 H4 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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