Bank and Sovereign Risk Interdependence in the Euro Area

Tryphon Kollintzas () and Konstantinos Tsoukalas

No 10485, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study bank risk and sovereign risk interdependence in the Euro Area. We find that an increase in capital investment risk shock, results in a considerably deeper recession when sovereign risk is also present. This result has three policy implications. First, Euro Area policies dealing with failing banks aggravated the recession. Second, although there has been a supranational effort with the creation of the EFSF/ESM to provide loans to sovereigns, as long as there is no direct mechanism for financial sector rescues, Euro Area policies continue to exacerbate the recession. Third, in favor of austerity measures used in the EA, we find that government spending multipliers are smaller in the presence of sovereign risk.

Keywords: Bank rescues; Cyclicality; Dsge model; Government spending multiplier; Investment risk; Sovereign risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E44 E52 E58 E62 E63 G21 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-eec and nep-mac
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