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Bribery Environment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries

Jan Hanousek () and Anna Kochanova ()

No 10499, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We examine the relation between bureaucratic corruption and firm performance in CEE countries. While previous research uses data from BEEPS, which suffers from excessive non-reporting of corporate performance, we combine reliable firm financials from the Amadeus database with information on bribery practices from BEEPS. We show that differing consequences of corruption found in previous studies could be explained by the corruption environment in which a firm operates. Basically, higher mean bribery is associated with lower performance, while higher dispersion of individual firm bribes appears to facilitate firm performance. A detailed analysis is conducted by firm sector and size, and countries’ institutional environments.

Keywords: bureaucratic corruption; CEE countries; firm bribing behavior; firm performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 D73 O12 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eur and nep-tra
Date: 2015-03
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