Coordination and the fight against tax havens

Kai Konrad and Tim Stolper

No 10519, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The success or failure of the fight against tax havens is the outcome of a coordination game between a tax haven and its potential investors. Key determinants are the costly international pressure and the haven country's revenue pool. The latter is determined endogenously by the decisions of many individual investors. Our findings explain why some havens attract large sources of international investment and earn large revenues while other countries do not, and why their profits are not competed away. We identify a trade-off between fighting tax havens and high tax rates or, similarly, small fines for disclosed tax evasion.

Keywords: Tax havens; Tax evasion; Initiatives against harmful tax practices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 H26 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coordination and the fight against tax havens (2016)
Working Paper: Coordination and the fight against tax havens (2016)
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