Dismissal Disputes and Endogenous Sorting

Gerard Pfann and Pietro Garibaldi

No 10684, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Dismissal disputes occur mostly in recessions and often lead to long and costly contract termination procedures. This paper investigates how dispute procedures may affect the job-matching process. First we present a simple accounting framework that corresponds with general dismissal legislation, but is sufficiently flexible to accommodate country-specific legislation. Detailed information from a sample of 2,191 disputes that occurred in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2009 is used to adjust the framework to Dutch institutional specificity. The resulting equilibrium matching model is solved to explain endogenous sorting between lengthy and costly firing procedures. The model also rationalizes the longevity of the dual Dutch model and its political resilience.

Keywords: Disputes; Firing; Legislation; Sorting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J08 J38 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-law and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP10684 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Dismissal Disputes and Endogenous Sorting (2015)
Working Paper: Dismissal Disputes and Endogenous Sorting (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10684

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP10684

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().