Property crime and private protection allocation within cities: theory and evidence

Tanguy van Ypersele, Steeve Mongrain and Bruno Decreuse

No 10707, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We model the allocation of property crime and private protection within cities. We provide a theory where city-specific criminals choose a neighborhood and whether they pay a search cost to compare potential victims, whereas households invest in self-protection. The model features strategic complementarity between criminals' search efforts and households' protection investments. As criminals' return to search increases with neighborhood wealth, households in rich neighborhoods are more likely to enter a rat race to ever greater protection that drives criminals towards poorer areas. The mechanisms of our model are tested with the Canadian General Social Survey. Household protection increases with household and neighborhood incomes, neighborhood protection, and neighborhood victimization.

Keywords: Economics of crime; Search frictions; Private protection; Social multiplier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Property crime and private protection allocation within cities: Theory and evidence (2022)
Working Paper: Property crime and private protection allocation within cities: Theory and evidence (2022)
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