The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV

Paolo Pinotti and Andrea Tesei
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ruben Durante

No 10738, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the political impact of entertainment television in Italy exploiting the staggered introduction of Berlusconi's commercial TV network, Mediaset, in the early 1980s. We find that individuals with early access to Mediaset all-entertainment content were more likely to vote for Berlusconi's party in 1994, when he first ran for offce. The effect persists for five elections and is driven by heavy TV viewers, namely the very young and the elders. Regarding possible mechanisms, we find that individuals exposed to entertainment TV as children were less cognitively sophisticated and civic-minded as adults, and ultimately more vulnerable to Berlusconi's populist rhetoric.

Keywords: Entertainment; Italy; Political participation; Television; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L82 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cul, nep-his, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV (2019)
Working Paper: The political legacy of entertainment TV (2017)
Working Paper: The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV (2015)
Working Paper: The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV (2015)
Working Paper: The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV (2015)
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