Information and Market Power

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Tibor Heumann

No 10791, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that the nature of the private information determines the market power of the agents and thus price and volume of equilibrium trade. We provide a characterization of the set of all joint distributions over demands and payoff states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. In demand function competition, the agents condition their demand on the endogenous information contained in the price. We compare the set of feasible outcomes under demand function to the feasible outcomes under Cournot competition. We find that the first and second moments of the equilibrium distribution respond very differently to the private information of the agents under these two market structures. The first moment of the equilibrium demand, the average demand, is more sensitive to the nature of the private information in demand function competition, reflecting the strategic impact of private information. By contrast, the second moments are less sensitive to the private information, reflecting the common conditioning on the price among the agents.

Keywords: Bayes correlated equilibrium; Demand function competition; Incomplete information; Linear best responses; market power; Moment restrictions; Price impact; Quadratic payoffs; Supply function competition; Volatility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 D83 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Information and Market Power (2018)
Working Paper: Information and Market Power (2017)
Working Paper: Information and Market Power (2015)
Working Paper: Information and Market Power (2015)
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