Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade

Volker Nocke, Holger Breinlich and Nicolas Schutz

No 10851, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. We calibrate the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada. Our results suggest that at present levels of trade costs, merger policy is too tough in the vast majority of sectors. We also quantify the resulting externalities and study the impact of different regimes of coordinating merger policies at varying levels of trade costs.

Keywords: Oligopoly; International trade; Merger policy; Mergers and acquisitions; Trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2020)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2018)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2016)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2016)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2015)
Working Paper: Merger policy in a quantitative model of internationaltrade (2015)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2015)
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