Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service

Imran Rasul and Daniel Rogger (drogger@worldbank.org)

No 11078, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study how the management practices bureaucrats operate under correlate to the quantity of public services delivered, using data from the Nigerian Civil Service. We have hand-coded independent engineering assessments of 4700 project completion rates. We supplement this with a management survey in the bureaucracies responsible for these projects, building on Bloom and Van Reenen [2007]. Management practices matter: increasing bureaucrats' autonomy is positively associated with completion rates, yet practices related to incentives/monitoring of bureaucrats are negatively associated with completion rates. Our evidence provides new insights on the importance of management in public bureaucracies in a developing country setting.

Keywords: Bureaucracy; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 O20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service (2018)
Working Paper: Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service (2013)
Working Paper: Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: evidence from the Nigerian civil service (2013)
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