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Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs

Winand Emons () and Claude Fluet ()

No 11105, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: A decision-maker relies on information of parties affected by her decision. These parties try to influence her decision by selective disclosure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Typically, they never reveal all information. A better outcome may be implemented if the decision-maker adopts an active stance by barring one party from reporting or through cheap talk allowing coordination on a particular equilibrium.

Keywords: active judging; adversarial; disclosure; inquisitorial; persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2016-02
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Journal Article: Strategic communication with reporting costs (2019) Downloads
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Working Paper: Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs (2016) Downloads
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