Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards

Lóránth, Gyöngyi, Christian Laux and Julian Kolm

No 11380, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze the limits of regulating bank CEO compensation to reduce risk shifting in the presence of an active board that retains the right to approve new investment strategies. Compensation regulation prevents overinvestment in strategies that increase risk, but it is ineffective in preventing underinvestment in strategies that reduce risk. The regulator optimally combines compensation and capital regulations. In contrast, if the board delegates the choice of strategy to the CEO, compensation regulation is sufficient to prevent both types of risk shifting. Compensation regulation increases shareholders' incentives to implement an active board, which reduces the effectiveness of compensation regulation.

Keywords: Bank regulation; Executive compensation; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-hrm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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