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The Marginal Voter's Curse

Helios Herrera, Aniol Llorente-Saguer () and Joseph McMurray ()

No 11463, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper proposes a rational model of voter participation by generalizing a common-value model of costless voting to include not just pivotal voting but also marginal voting incentives. A new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case, to avoid the marginal voter's curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction. The marginal voter's curse presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter's curse. Moreover, marginal motivations are shown to dominate pivotal motivations in large elections. Model predictions are confirmed in a laboratory experiment and applied in a comparative analysis of electoral rules.

Keywords: Experiment; information aggregation; Turnout; Underdog effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Journal Article: The Marginal Voter's Curse (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: The Marginal Voter's Curse (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: The Marginal Voter's Curse (2016) Downloads
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