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Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases

Jakub Steiner and Olivier Gossner

No 11478, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study perception biases arising under second-best perception strategies. An agent correctly observes a parameter that is payoff-relevant in many decision problems that she encounters in her environment but is unable to retain all the information until her decision. A designer of the decision process chooses a perception strategy that determines the distribution of the perception errors. If some information loss is unavoidable due to cognition constraints, then (under additional conditions) the optimal perception strategy exhibits the illusion of control, overconfidence, and optimism.

Keywords: Perception; Overconfidence; Information processing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases (2016) Downloads
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