Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases
Jakub Steiner and
Olivier Gossner
No 11478, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We study perception biases arising under second-best perception strategies. An agent correctly observes a parameter that is payoff-relevant in many decision problems that she encounters in her environment but is unable to retain all the information until her decision. A designer of the decision process chooses a perception strategy that determines the distribution of the perception errors. If some information loss is unavoidable due to cognition constraints, then (under additional conditions) the optimal perception strategy exhibits the illusion of control, overconfidence, and optimism.
Keywords: Perception; Overconfidence; Information processing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11478 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases (2016)
Working Paper: Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11478
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11478
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().