Immigration Policies, Labor Complementarities, Population Size and Cultural Frictions: Theory and Evidence

Shlomo Weber () and Thomas Osang

No 11526, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper we consider a simple model of international migration developed in Fujita and Weber (2010). There are two countries A and B, that differ in population size, degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants, as well as cultural attitudes towards immigrants. The countries select immigration quotas for the world population of immigrants. We apply the existence result of Fujita-Weber and show that in equilibrium the larger country attracts more immigrants, while choosing a lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. Finally, we test the empiricalvalidity of the model using time-series country-level data and demonstrate that both cross-section and panel data approaches support several of the key theoretical findings.

Keywords: Immigration quotas; Nash equilibrium; Labor complementarity; Cultural frictions; Panel data; Fixed effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 F22 O3 R1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11526 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11526

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11526

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().