Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics

Paolo Pinotti, Alberto Alesina and Salvatore Piccolo ()

No 11641, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We show that in Sicily Mafia killings of politicians increase before elections and have negative effects on the vote received by parties not captured by the Mafia. Then, using a very large data set of electoral speeches, we find strong evidence that anti-mafia activities by politicians elected in Sicily are, in fact, negatively correlated with the levels of pre-electoral violence. Using data on homicides in all regions of Italy starting from the end of the nineteenth century, we identify a political cycle of homicides only in regions with organized crime. We also show how this electoral cycle changes as a function of different electoral rules and the relative strength of captured and non-captured parties. All these empirical findings are rationalized by a simple signaling model in which criminal organizations exert pre-electoral violence to inform adverse politicians about their military strength.

Keywords: Organized crime; Electoral violence; Voting; Political discourse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics (2019)
Working Paper: Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics (2016)
Working Paper: Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics (2016)
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