Distorted monopolistic competition

Kristian Behrens (), Giordano Mion, Südekum, Jens and Yasusada Murata
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jens Suedekum

No 11642, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We characterize the equilibrium and optimal resource allocations in a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with multiple asymmetric sectors and heterogeneous firms. We first derive general results for additively separable preferences and general productivity distributions, and then analyze specific examples that allow for closed-form solutions and a simple quantification procedure. Using data for France and the United Kingdom, we find that the aggregate welfare distortion — due to inefficient labor allocation and firm entry between sectors and inefficient selection and output within sectors — is equivalent to the contribution of 6–8% of the total labor input.

Keywords: Monopolistic competition; Welfare distortion; Intersectoral distortions; Intrasectoral distortions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D50 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Distorted monopolistic competition (2016)
Working Paper: Distorted monopolistic competition (2016)
Working Paper: Distorted monopolistic competition (2016)
Working Paper: Distorted monopolistic competition (2016)
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