Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II

Hans-Joachim Voth, Philipp Ager and Leonardo Bursztyn

No 11751, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Using newly-collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot is honored publicly, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increase. Fellow pilots react more if they come from the same region of Germany, or if they worked closely with him. Our results suggest that personal rivalry can be a prime motivating force, and that non-financial rewards can lead to a crowd-in of both effort and risk-taking via social connections.

Keywords: Status competition; Nonfinancial incentives; Employee motivation; Behavioral economics; World war ii (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J32 M52 N44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II (2016)
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