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Network Capital

Robert Akerlof and Richard Holden

No 11763, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper explores the problem of assembling capital for projects. It can be difficult to assemble capital, when it is disaggregated, for a project that exhibits increasing returns. Small investors may be reluctant to participate, as they may question the ability of the project owner to raise the additional capital he requires. This suggests the possibility that agents with blocks of capital (capital that is already aggregated) might earn rents. Similarly, agents with "network capital" — that is, an ability to aggregate the capital of others — may earn rents. In this paper, we develop a theory of the rents attached to capital assembly, and discuss the implications for a range of issues from investment, to growth, to inequality.

Keywords: Network capital; investment; Increasing returns; Inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D30 D85 G30 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-net and nep-ppm
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