Myopia and Discounting

Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson

No 11914, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We assume that perfectly patient agents estimate the value of future events by generating noisy, unbiased simulations and combining those signals with priors to form posteriors. These posterior expectations exhibit as-if discounting: agents make choices as if they were maximizing a stream of known utils weighted by a discount function, D(t). This as-if discount function reflects the fact that estimated utils are a combination of signals and priors, so average expectations are optimally shaded toward the mean of the prior distribution, generating behavior that partially mimics the properties of classical time preferences. When the simulation noise has variance that is linear in the event's horizon, the as-if discount function is hyperbolic, D(t)=1/(1+at). Our agents exhibit systematic preference reversals, but have no taste for commitment because they suffer from imperfect foresight, which is not a self-control problem. In our framework, agents that are more skilled at forecasting (e.g., those with more intelligence) exhibit less discounting. Agents with more domain-relevant experience exhibit less discounting. Older agents exhibit less discounting (except those with cognitive decline). Agents who are encouraged to spend more time thinking about an intertemporal tradeoff exhibit less discounting. Agents who are unable to think carefully about an intertemporal tradeoff -- e.g., due to cognitive load -- exhibit more discounting. In our framework, patience is highly unstable, fluctuating with the accuracy of forecasting.

Keywords: Behavioral economics; Discounting; Myopia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D14 E03 E23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac, nep-mic, nep-neu and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11914 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Myopia and Discounting (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11914

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11914

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().